Social norms in networks
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Ushchev, Philip; Zenou, Yves
署名单位:
HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Monash University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
刊物名称:
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN:
0022-0531
DOI:
10.1016/j.jet.2019.104969
发表日期:
2020
关键词:
social norms
Conformism
Local-average model
welfare
Anti-conformism
network formation
摘要:
Although the linear-in-means model is the workhorse model in empirical work on peer effects, its theoretical properties are understudied. In this study, we develop a social-norm model that provides a micro-foundation of the linear-in-means model and investigate its properties. We show that individual outcomes may increase, decrease, or vary non-monotonically with the taste for conformity. Equilibria are usually inefficient and, to restore the first best, the planner needs to subsidize (tax) agents whose neighbors make efforts above (below) the social norms. Thus, giving more subsidies to more central agents is not necessarily efficient. We also discuss the policy implications of our model in terms of education and crime. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.