Information disclosure and full surplus extraction inmechanism design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kraehmer, Daniel
• 署名单位: University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105020
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: Information design; mechanism design; Quasi-linear utility; Rent extraction

摘要

I study mechanism design settings with quasi-linear utility where the principal can provide agents with additional private information about their valuations beyond the private information they hold at the outset. I demonstrate that the principal can design information and a mechanism so as to implement the same outcome as if the additional information was publicly known. The key idea is that the principal secretly randomizes over information structures which allows her to cross-check the consistency of agents' reports. As an implication, the principal can fully extract the first-best surplus in a large class of cases. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.