-
作者：De Filippis, Roberta; Guarino, Antonio; Jehiel, Philippe; Kitagawa, Toru
作者单位：University of London; University College London; Paris School of Economics
摘要：In our laboratory experiment, subjects, in sequence, have to predict the value of a good. The second subject in the sequence makes his prediction twice: first (first belief), after he observes his predecessor's prediction; second (posterior belief'), after he observes his private signal. We find that the second subjects weigh their signal as a Bayesian agent would do when the signal confirms their first belief; they overweight the signal when it contradicts their first belief. This way of upda...
-
作者：Zhou, Hang
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This paper investigates the effect of strategic reasoning on financial markets with a level-k thinking framework. A level-k speculator performs k rounds of iterative reasoning to infer information from asset prices. In contrast to the static rational expectations equilibrium, the level-k framework produces a unified theory of momentum and contrarian trading strategies. Besides, this paper discusses how the distribution of sophistication levels affects several market variables and it sheds new ...
-
作者：Hua, Xiameng; Watson, Joel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We add to the literature on long-term relationships with variable stakes and incomplete information by analyzing a discrete-time trust game between a principal and agent, with a continuum of types. In each period the principal selects the level of a project and the agent then decides whether to cooperate or betray; payoffs in the period scale with the level. The agent's benefit of betraying is privately known. The discrete-time framework allows for analysis of renegotiation in terms of an inte...
-
作者：Kuvalekar, Aditya; Lipnowski, Elliot; Ramos, Joao
作者单位：University of Essex; Columbia University; University of Southern California; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：An expert advises a decision maker over time. With both the quality of advice and the extent to which it is followed remaining private, the players have limited information with which to discipline each other. Even so, communication in and of itself facilitates cooperation, the relationship evolving based on the expert's advice. We show a formal equivalence between our setting and one of cheap talk with capped money burning, enabling an exact characterization (at fixed discounting) of the expe...
-
作者：Echenique, Federico; Miyashita, Masaki; Nakamura, Yuta; Pomatto, Luciano; Vinson, Jamie
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Yale University; Yokohama City University
摘要：We propose a model of incomplete twofold multiprior preferences, in which an act f is ranked above an act g only when f provides higher utility in a worst-case scenario than what g provides in a best-case scenario. The model explains failures of contingent reasoning, captured through a weakening of the state by-state monotonicity (or dominance) axiom. Our model gives rise to rich comparative statics results, as well as extension exercises, and connections to choice theory. We present an applic...
-
作者：Fernandez-Duque, Mauricio
作者单位：Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas A.C. (CIDE)
摘要：I develop a theory of group interaction in which individuals who act sequentially are concerned with conforming to what they believe is the majority attitude. Pluralistic ignorance may arise, an outcome with incomplete learning in which individuals conform to a mistaken sense of the majority attitude, earning the majority's disapproval. The degree of uncertainty about the population distribution of attitudes affects what individuals learn about the group. A central finding is that the learning...
-
作者：Li, Qi
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：This paper studies security design with adverse selection when verifiable retention is impossible due to market segmentation and price opacity across market segments. Rather than signaling through retention, sellers in the model signal quality through posted prices, which is feasible because the posted price affects buyers' search behavior and the equilibrium probability of selling. The optimal security design, in this case, is to break up the cash flow of an asset into several debt securities...
-
作者：Goryunov, Maxim; Rigos, Alexandros
作者单位：Nazarbayev University; Lund University
摘要：We experimentally test theoretical predictions on equilibrium selection in a two-player coordination (investment) game. Through a minimal visual variation, our design prompts participants to play strategies whereby investing probability is either continuous or discontinuous in the payoff-relevant state. When participants use continuous strategies, average behavior is consistent with play in the risk-dominant equilibrium, the unique theoretical prediction. When they use discontinuous strategies...
-
作者：Robson, Arthur; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：Simon Fraser University; Yale University
摘要：We examine the evolutionary selection of attitudes toward aggregate risk in an age structured population. Aggregate shocks perturb the population's consumption possibilities. Consumption is converted to fertility via a technology that exhibits first increasing and then decreasing returns to scale, captured in the simplest case by a fertility threshold. We show that evolution will select preferences that exhibit arbitrarily high aversion to aggregate risks with even very small probabilities of ...
-
作者：Jindani, Sam
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：The folk theorem tells us that a wide range of payoffs can be sustained as equilibria in an infinitely repeated game. Existing results about learning in repeated games suggest that players may converge to an equilibrium, but do not address selection between equilibria. I propose a stochastic learning rule that selects a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the repeated game in which payoffs are efficient. The exact payoffs selected depend on how players experiment; two natural specifications yield t...
