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作者：[Anonymous]
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作者：Friedman, Daniel; Rabanal, Jean Paul; Rud, Olga A.; Zhao, Shuchen
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; University of Essex; Universitetet i Stavanger; Dongbei University of Finance & Economics
摘要：Absent coordinating signals from an exogenous benevolent agent, can an efficient correlated equilibrium emerge? Theoretical work in adaptive dynamics suggests a positive answer, which we test in a laboratory experiment. In the well-known Chicken game, we observe time average play that is close to the asymmetric pure Nash equilibrium in some treatments, and in other treatments we observe collusive play. In a game resembling rock-paper-scissors or matching pennies, we observe time average play c...
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作者：Pinter, Miklos
作者单位：Corvinus University Budapest; Budapest University of Technology & Economics
摘要：Taking advantage of ambiguity in strategic situations is well documented in the literature. However, so far there are only few results on how to make ambiguous strategies. In this paper we introduce a procedure which makes objective ambiguity, concretely it draws an element from a set of priors, defined by a belief function, in a way that it does not lead to any probability distribution over the priors. Moreover, we define the notion of ambiguous strategy, and by means of examples we show how ...
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作者：Deng, Liuchun; Khan, M. Ali; Mitra, Tapan
作者单位：Yale NUS College; Johns Hopkins University; Cornell University
摘要：In this paper, we offer necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of odd-period cycles and turbulence in a continuous unimodal interval map. The characterizations we present are original both to the economic and the mathematical literature, and go beyond existential assertions to easy verifiability. We apply our two theorems to six different canonical models in the literature on economic dynamics, all being grounded in the fact that their policy functions are given by continuous uni...
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作者：Bowen, Renee; Hwang, Ilwoo; Krasa, Stefan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research; Seoul National University (SNU); University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We study bargaining between a fixed agenda-setter and responder over successive issues. If the responder rejects the setter's proposal, the setter can attempt to assert her will to implement her ideal and will succeed with a probability that depends on her personal power. Players learn about the setter's power as gridlock persists. Gridlock occurs when the setter's perceived power is either too high or too low, and the players reach compromise when the setter has moderate personal power. The p...
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作者：Oechssler, Joerg; Reischmann, Andreas; Sofianos, Andis
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：We present a new and simple mechanism for repeated public good environments. In the Conditional Contribution Mechanism (CCM), agents send two messages of the form, I am willing to contribute x units to the public good if in total y units are contributed. This mechanism offers agents risk-free strategies, which we call unexploitable. Our main theorem states that all outcomes of the CCM will eventually be Pareto efficient if agents choose unexploitable better responses. We conduct a laboratory e...
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作者：Gagnon-Bartsch, Tristan; Bushong, Benjamin
作者单位：Harvard University; Michigan State University
摘要：We examine errors in learning that arise when an agent who suffers attribution bias fails to account for her reference-dependent utility. Such an agent neglects how the sensation of elation or disappointment relative to expectations contributes to her overall utility, and wrongly attributes this component of her utility to the intrinsic value of an outcome. In a sequential-learning environment, this form of misattribution generates contrast effects in evaluations and induces a recency bias: th...
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作者：Kets, Willemien; Kager, Wouter; Sandroni, Alvaro
作者单位：University of Oxford; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Northwestern University
摘要：The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding how the value changes with economic primitives is critical for policy design and welfare. However, for games with multiple equilibria, the value is difficult to determine. We therefore develop a new theory of the value of coordination games. The theory delivers testable comparative statics on the value and delivers novel insights relevant to policy design. For example, policies that shift behav...
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作者：Erol, Selman; Vohra, Rakesh
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; University of Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We propose a model of network formation where agent's payoffs depend on the connected component they belong to in a way that is specific enough to be tractable yet general enough to accommodate a number of economically relevant settings. Among them are formation in the presence of contagion via links and collaboration with spillovers. A key feature of this setting is that the externalities stem from links rather than nodes. We characterize stable and efficient networks. Under negative external...
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作者：Kashaev, Nail; Aguiar, Victor H.
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：We generalize the stochastic revealed preference methodology of McFadden and Richter (1990) for fi-nite choice sets to settings with limited consideration. Our approach is nonparametric and requires partial choice set variation. We impose a monotonicity condition on attention first proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2020) and a stability condition on the marginal distribution of preferences. Our framework is amenable to statistical testing. These new restrictions extend widely known parametric model...
