Goodwill in communication

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kuvalekar, Aditya; Lipnowski, Elliot; Ramos, Joao
• 署名单位: University of Essex; Columbia University; University of Southern California; University of London; Queen Mary University London
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105467
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: Cheap talk; COMMUNICATION; persuasion; Repeated game

摘要

An expert advises a decision maker over time. With both the quality of advice and the extent to which it is followed remaining private, the players have limited information with which to discipline each other. Even so, communication in and of itself facilitates cooperation, the relationship evolving based on the expert's advice. We show a formal equivalence between our setting and one of cheap talk with capped money burning, enabling an exact characterization (at fixed discounting) of the expert's attainable payoffs. While an ongoing relationship often helps, our characterization implies that, absent feedback, relational incentives can never restore commitment.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.