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作者：Safra, Zvi; Segal, Uzi
作者单位：University of Warwick; Boston College
摘要：We consider a risk averse decision maker who dislikes ambiguity as in the Ellsberg urns. We analyze atti-tudes to ambiguity when the decision maker is exposed to unrelated sequences of ambiguous situations. We discuss the Choquet expected utility, the smooth, and the maxmin models. Our main results offer conditions under which ambiguity aversion disappears even without learning and conditions under which it does not. An appendix analyzes compound gambles within the expected utility model and d...
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作者：Chatterjee, Kalyan; Guryev, Konstantin; Hu, Tai-Wei
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Bristol
摘要：A decision-maker faces a decision problem to choose an action, at a randomly determined time, to match an unknown state of nature. She has access to a sequence of signals partially informative of the current state of nature. The state of nature evolves according to a Markov chain. The decision-maker is subject to constraints on information-processing capacity, modelled here by a finite set of memory states. We char-acterize when optimal inference is possible with these constraints and, when it...
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作者：Auster, Sarah; Kellner, Christian
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; University of Mannheim; University of Southampton
摘要：We study the properties of Dutch auctions in an independent private value setting, where bidders face uncertainty over the type distribution of their opponents and evaluate their payoffs by the worst case from a set of probabilistic scenarios. In contrast to static auction formats, participants in the Dutch auction gradually learn about the valuations of other bidders. We show that the transmitted information can lead to changes in the worst-case distribution and thereby shift a bidder's payof...
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作者：Herresthal, Claudia
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：A decision maker faces a choice to withdraw or to retain a product but is uncertain about its safety. An agent can gather information through sequential testing. Players agree on the optimal choice under certainty, but the decision maker has a higher safety standard than the agent. We compare the case where testing is hidden and the agent can choose whether to disclose his findings to the case where testing is observable. The agent can exploit the additional discretion under hidden testing to ...
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作者：Blume, Andreas; Deimen, Inga; Inoue, Sean
作者单位：University of Arizona; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Colgate University
摘要：We consider a principal's choice between either controlling an agent's action through an incomplete contract or guiding him through non-binding communication. The principal anticipates receiving private information and must hire an agent to take an action on her behalf. Contracts can only specify a limited number of actions as a function of the state. The principal is at liberty not to specify actions for some of the states. States not covered by the contract induce a communication game. Contr...
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作者：Wagner, Peter A.; Klein, Nicolas
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We study social learning from actions and outcomes. Agents learn about future returns through privately observed signals, others' investment decisions and public experimentation outcomes when returns are realized. We characterize symmetric equilibria, and relate the extent of strategic delay of investments in equilibrium to the primitives of the information structure. Agents invest without delay in equilibrium when the most optimistic interim belief exceeds a threshold. Otherwise, delay in inv...
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作者：Shigeta, Yuki
作者单位：Tokyo Keizai University
摘要：This paper examines an Epstein-Zin recursive utility with quasi-hyperbolic discounting in continuous time. I directly define the utility process supporting the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation in the literature and consider Merton's optimal consumption-investment problem for application. I show that a solution to the HJB equation is the value function. The numerical and mathematical analyses show that un-like in the constant relative risk aversion utility, present bias in the Epstein-Zin...
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作者：Bavly, Gilad; Heller, Yuval; Schreiber, Amnon
作者单位：Bar Ilan University
摘要：We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmetric information about the prize's location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium that yields the first-best payoff (i.e., the highest social payoff under any strategy profile), and we characterize the first-best payoff. The results have interesting implica-tions for innovation contests and R&D races. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. A...
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作者：Lahkar, Ratul; Mukherjee, Sayan; Roy, Souvik
作者单位：Ashoka University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
摘要：We consider a generalization of perturbed best response dynamics in population games with a continuum of strategies. The previous literature has considered the logit dynamic generated through the Shannon entropy as a deterministic perturbation. We consider a wider class of deterministic perturbations satisfying lower semicontinuity and strong convexity. Apart from the Shannon entropy, Tsallis entropy and Burg entropy are other perturbations that satisfy these conditions. We thereby generate th...
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作者：Cerreia-Vioglio, Simone; Maccheroni, Fabio; Marinacci, Massimo
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：We study how changes in wealth affect ambiguity attitudes. We define a decision maker as decreasing (resp., increasing) absolute ambiguity averse if he becomes less (resp., more) ambiguity averse as he becomes richer. Our definition is behavioral. We provide different characterizations of these attitudes for a large class of preferences: monotone and continuous preferences which satisfy risk independence. We then specialize our results for different subclasses of preferences. Inter alia, our c...
