Non-point-source pollution regulation as a multi-task principal-agent problem

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chambers, RG; Quiggin, J
• 署名单位: Australian National University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(94)01486-8
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 95-116
• 关键词: multi-task principal-agent; non-point-source solution; mechanism design

摘要

This paper considers a multi-task, principal-agent problem where risk-averse farmers possessing private information have two tasks, pollution control and corn production, but only direct incentive for corn production. Using a highly tractable reformulation of the standard uncertain production model, a general method for solving the associated constrained Paretian problem is developed and analyzed. The optimal solution is shown to obey a generalized inverse-elasticity rule, and the optimal solution is characterized under a number of assumptions about the underlying technology and the role that pollution emission plays in reducing farmer risk.