A prisoner's dilemma model of collusion deterrence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kofman, F; Lawarree, J
• 署名单位: University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Universite Libre de Bruxelles
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(94)01483-3
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 117-136
• 关键词: Collusion; hierarchies; monitoring; auditing

摘要

We examine a hierarchy formed by a principal, a supervisor and an agent, wherein the supervisor and the agent can collude. We consider a case where collusion-free supervisors are not available. We demonstrate first that it is easy for the principal to deter collusion by introducing a second supervisor and designing a mechanism similar to the prisoner's dilemma so that the two supervisors control each other. Since it could prove too costly for the principal to send two supervisors, a new question arises: whether it would be possible to deter collusion by sending the second supervisor with a probability less than one. We find that under reasonable assumptions on the size of rewards and punishments, the principal can prevent collusion only by 'creating' a new type of supervisor through sometimes informing the second supervisor of his position.