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作者：Lakdawalla, D; Zanjani, G
作者单位：RAND Corporation; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要：This paper investigates the rationale for public intervention in the terrorism insurance market. It argues that government subsidies for terror insurance have the effect of discouraging self-protection and limiting the negative externalities associated with self-protection. Cautious self-protective behavior by a target can hurt public goods like national prestige if it is seen as giving in' to the terrorists, and may increase the loss probabilities faced by others by encouraging terrorists to ...
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作者：Cinyabuguma, M; Page, T; Putterman, L
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：In a public goods experiment with the opportunity to vote to expel members of a group, we found that contributions rose to nearly 100% of endowments with significantly higher efficiency compared with a no-expulsion baseline. Our findings support the intuition that the threat of expulsion or ostracism is a device that helps some groups to provide public goods. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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作者：Gailmard, S; Palfrey, TR
作者单位：Princeton University; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper compares three collective choice procedures for the provision of excludable public goods under incomplete information. One, serial cost sharing (SCS), is budget balanced, individually rational, anonymous and strategy proof. The other two are hybrid procedures: voluntary cost sharing with proportional rebates (PCs) and with no rebates (NR). PCs satisfies all these properties except strategy proofness, and NR satisfies all the properties except for strategy proofness and budget balanc...
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作者：Gradstein, M; Justman, M
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：In the United States, parents are offered free public education in the mainstream culture but must pay the full cost of tuition if they educate their children privately. This creates strong economic incentives for remaining within the public system, which promotes the assimilation of minorities. A Pareto improvement can be achieved by subsidizing private education in exchange for modifying its social content so as to reduce polarization. Popular opposition to voucher programs that facilitate s...
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作者：Asch, B; Haider, SJ; Zissimopoulos, J
作者单位：Michigan State University; RAND Corporation
摘要：We examine the retirement behavior of federal civil service workers employed by the Department of Defense. These workers provide an interesting population for studying retirement because they face relatively simple financial incentives, high quality administrative data are available, and they are not covered by the Social Security system. We find that these workers respond to their financial incentives in a similar manner to what others have found when analyzing much different retirement syste...
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作者：Auriol, E; Warlters, M
摘要：Informal sectors are larger in developing countries than in rich countries. This is a result of higher fixed costs of entry into the formal economy in developing countries. We show that raising barriers to entry is consistent with a deliberate government policy for raising tax revenue. By generating market power, and hence rents, for the permitted entrants, market entry fees foster the emergence of large taxpayers. The rents can be readily confiscated by the government through entry fees and t...
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作者：Kopczuk, W
作者单位：Columbia University; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Tax reforms usually change both tax rates and tax bases. Using a panel of income tax returns spanning the two major U.S. tax reforms of the 1980s and a number of smaller tax law changes, I find that the elasticity of income reported on personal income tax returns depends on the available deductions. This highlights that this key behavioral elasticity is not an immutable parameter but rather that it can be to some extent controlled by policy makers. One implication is that base broadening reduc...
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作者：Svarer, M; Rosholm, M; Munch, JR
作者单位：Aarhus University; University of Copenhagen
摘要：In this paper we analyse how rent control affects the duration of individual unemployment. In a theoretical search model we distinguish between two effects of rent control. On one hand, rent control reduces housing mobility and hence mobility in the labour market. On the other hand, to maintain rent control benefits, unemployed individuals are more likely to accept job offers in the local labour market. Based on a rich Danish data set, we find that the probability of finding a local job increa...
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作者：Bateman, I; Kahneman, D; Munro, A; Starmer, C; Sugden, R
作者单位：University of East Anglia; University of Nottingham; Princeton University; University of East Anglia
摘要：This paper reports an 'adversarial collaboration'-a project carried out by two individuals or research groups who, having proposed conflicting hypotheses, seek to resolve their dispute. It describes an experiment which investigates whether, when individuals consider giving up money in exchange for goods, they construe money outlays as losses or as foregone gains. This issue bears on the explanation of the widely observed disparity between willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA...
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作者：Seely, B; Van Huyck, J; Battalio, R
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：This paper reports an experiment investigating how assignments improve economic efficiency in a modified version of the standard voluntary-contributions mechanism. The experiment uses a nonbinding message that makes common information assignments in the repeated game. A credible assignment is one actually followed by the participants. It turns out to be difficult to credibly assign the symmetric efficient outcome in four person cohorts, but we did discover one assignment that was credible in t...
