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作者：Li, HB; Zhou, LA
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; Peking University
摘要：In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the incentive role of personnel control in post-reform China. Employing the turnover data of top provincial leaders in China between 1979 and 1995, we find that the likelihood of promotion of provincial leaders increases with their economic performance, while the likelihood of termination decreases with their economic performance. This finding is robust to various sensitivity tests. We also find that the turnover of provincial leaders is more sen...
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作者：Niepelt, D
作者单位：Stockholm University; Study Center Gerzensee
摘要：Standard models of tax evasion implicitly assume that evasion is either fully detected, or not detected at all. Empirically, this is not the case, casting into doubt the traditional rationales for interior evasion choices. I propose two alternative, dynamic explanations for interior tax evasion rates: First, fines increasing in the duration of an evasion spell, implying that the expected costs of evasion increase convexly with the time spent non-reporting, while the benefits increase linearly....
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作者：Jehiel, P; Thisse, JF
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：This paper deals with collective decision making within a group of independent states. The right to choose the public policy is delegated from the central authority to one of the states through a bidding procedure among the group state members. We identify the following tradeoff. competition among states yields higher transfers to the central authority, but the outcome tends to be less efficient than what it is when states negotiate prior to the decision making process. We extend and illustrat...
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作者：Galasso, E; Ravallion, M
作者单位：The World Bank
摘要：Developing country governments often delegate authority over the targeting of antipoverty programs to community organizations, while retaining control over how much goes to each community. We offer a theoretical characterization of the information structure in such programs and the interconnected behavior of the various players. Our model motivates an econometric specification for explaining distributional outcomes. Results for Bangladesh's Food-for-Education (FFE) Program indicate that within...
