Financial incentives and retirement: evidence from federal civil service workers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Asch, B; Haider, SJ; Zissimopoulos, J
• 署名单位: Michigan State University; RAND Corporation
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.12.006
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 427-440
• 关键词: Retirement; option value model; pensions

摘要

We examine the retirement behavior of federal civil service workers employed by the Department of Defense. These workers provide an interesting population for studying retirement because they face relatively simple financial incentives, high quality administrative data are available, and they are not covered by the Social Security system. We find that these workers respond to their financial incentives in a similar manner to what others have found when analyzing much different retirement systems. We also find no evidence of excess retirement at key ages of the Social Security system, which does not support the existence of societal-wide norms regarding retirement. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.