Credible assignments can improve efficiency in laboratory public goods games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Seely, B; Van Huyck, J; Battalio, R
• 署名单位: Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.02.010
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 1437-1455
• 关键词: subgame perfection; credible assignments; coordination failure; public goods; human behavior

摘要

This paper reports an experiment investigating how assignments improve economic efficiency in a modified version of the standard voluntary-contributions mechanism. The experiment uses a nonbinding message that makes common information assignments in the repeated game. A credible assignment is one actually followed by the participants. It turns out to be difficult to credibly assign the symmetric efficient outcome in four person cohorts, but we did discover one assignment that was credible in the last match of the evolutionary repeated game. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.