Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cinyabuguma, M; Page, T; Putterman, L
• 署名单位: Brown University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.011
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 1421-1435
• 关键词: Public goods; collective action; PUNISHMENT

摘要

In a public goods experiment with the opportunity to vote to expel members of a group, we found that contributions rose to nearly 100% of endowments with significantly higher efficiency compared with a no-expulsion baseline. Our findings support the intuition that the threat of expulsion or ostracism is a device that helps some groups to provide public goods. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.