Crime and the labor market: A search model with optimal contracts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Engelhardt, Bryan; Rocheteau, Guillaume; Rupert, Peter
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; College of the Holy Cross; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland; University of California System; University of California Irvine
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.04.016
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 1876-1891
• 关键词: crime; unemployment; search; matching

摘要

This paper extends the Pissarides [Pissarides, Christopher A. Equilibrium Unemployment Theory. Cambridge: MIT (2000)] model of the labor market to include crime and punishment A la Becker [Becker, Gary S. Crime and punishment: an economic approach. journal of Political Economy 76 (1968): 169-217]. All workers, irrespective of their labor force status, can commit crimes and the employment contract is determined optimally. The model is used to study, analytically and quantitatively, the effects of various labor market and crime policies. For instance, a more generous unemployment insurance system reduces the crime rate of the unemployed but its effect on the crime rate of the employed depends on job duration and jail sentences. When the model is calibrated to U.S. data, the overall effect is to decrease crime, but is quantitatively small. Small wage subsidies reduce unemployment and crime rates of employed and unemployed workers, and raise society's welfare. Hiring subsidies reduce unemployment but they can raise the crime rate of employed workers. Crime policies (police technology and jail sentences) affect crime rates significantly but have only negligible effects on the labor market. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.