A simple scheme to improve the efficiency of referenda

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Casella, Alessandra; Gelman, Andrew
• 署名单位: Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.05.002
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 2240-2261
• 关键词: Referendum; voting; Majority Voting; Large elections; Storable votes; Direct democracy

摘要

Referenda are becoming a common tool for public decision-making, and as reliance on direct democracy increases, so does the importance of giving representation to strongly held minority preferences. This paper discusses a very simple scheme that treats everybody symmetrically but gives weight to intense preferences: voters faced with a number of binary proposals are given one regular vote for each proposal plus a single additional bonus vote to cast as desired. Decisions are then taken according to the majority of votes cast. We study the scheme in a number of different models and identify empirically plausible conditions under which ex ante utility increases, relative to simple majority voting. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.