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作者：Boehringer, Christoph; Lange, Andreas; Rutherford, Thomas F.
作者单位：Carl von Ossietzky Universitat Oldenburg; University of Hamburg; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Carbon leakage provides an efficiency argument for differentiated emission prices in favor of emission-intensive and trade-exposed sectors under unilateral climate policy. However, differential emission pricing can be used as a beggar-thy-neighbor policy to exploit terms of trade. Adopting an optimal tax framework, we propose a method to decompose the leakage and terms-of-trade motives for emission price differentiation. We employ our method for the quantitative impact assessment of unilateral...
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作者：Fu, Qiang; Li, Ming
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Concordia University - Canada
摘要：We study the policy choice of an office-holding politician who is concerned with the public's perception of his capabilities. The politician decides whether to maintain the status quo or to conduct a risky reform. The reform's success depends critically on the politician's capabilities, which are privately known to the politician. The public observes both his policy choice and the outcome of the reform, and assesses his competence. We show that the politician may engage in socially detrimental...
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作者：Bergolo, Marcelo; Cruces, Guillermo
作者单位：Universidad de la Republica, Uruguay; National University of La Plata; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：This article studies how social insurance programs shape individual's incentives to take up registered employment and to report earnings to the tax authorities. The analysis is based on a social insurance reform in Uruguay that extended healthcare coverage to the dependent children of registered private-sector workers. The identification strategy relies on a comparison between individuals with and without dependent children before and after the reform. The reform increased benefit-eligible reg...
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作者：Abeler, Johannes; Becker, Anke; Falk, Armin
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Bonn
摘要：A central assumption in economics is that people misreport their private information if this is to their material benefit. Several recent models depart from this assumption and posit that some people do not lie or at least do not lie maximally. These models invoke many different underlying motives including intrinsic lying costs, altruism, efficiency concerns, or conditional cooperation. To provide an empirically-validated microfoundation for these models, it is crucial to understand the relev...
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作者：Cockburn, John; Duclos, Jean-Yves; Zabsonre, Agnes
作者单位：Laval University
摘要：We assess whether global social welfare has improved in the last decades despite (or because of) the substantial increase in global population. We use for this purpose a relatively unknown but simple and attractive social evaluation approach called critical-level generalized utilitarianism (CLGU). CLGU posits that social welfare increases with population size if and only if the new lives come with a level of living standards higher than that of a critical level. Despite its attractiveness, CLG...
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作者：Li, Tad; Han, Li; Zhang, Linxiu; Rozelle, Scott
作者单位：University of Macau; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Chinese Academy of Sciences; Stanford University
摘要：In a randomized trial conducted with primary school students in China, we find that pairing high and low achieving classmates as benchmates and offering them group incentives for learning improved low achiever test scores by approximately 0.265 standard deviations without harming the high achievers. Offering only low achievers incentives for learning in a separate trial had no effect. Pure peer effects at the benchmate level are not sufficiently powerful to explain the differences between thes...
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作者：Borcan, Oana; Lindahl, Mikael; Mitrut, Andreea
作者单位：University of Gothenburg; Uppsala University; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Bucharest University of Economic Studies
摘要：This paper aims to understand how corruption responds to an income loss. We exploit an unexpected 25% wage cut incurred in 2010 by all Romanian public sector employees, including the public education staff. We investigate a corruptible high-stake exam taking place shortly after the wage announcement. To measure corruption we compare changes in exam outcomes from 2007 to 2010 between public and private schools, as the latter were not affected by the policy. We find that the wage loss induced be...
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作者：Barseghyan, Levon; Coate, Stephen
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：This paper explores the provision of a durable public good in Romer and Rosenthal's agenda setter model. It identifies a type of equilibrium, called a Romer-Rosenthal equilibrium, in which in every period the bureaucrat proposes the maximum level of public investment the voter will support. The paper establishes that such an equilibrium exists for a variety of public good benefit functions. Equilibrium public good levels converge or almost converge to a steady state. These steady states can in...
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作者：Joulfaian, David
作者单位：United States Department of the Treasury
摘要：Life insurance proceeds are generally subject to the estate tax. An exception is when the policy is owned by the beneficiaries and the insured gives up ownership and control, including the ability to change beneficiaries. Should the insured strategically own the policy contract and potentially subject proceeds to estate and inheritance taxes, or relinquish control, with the beneficiaries owning the policy, and escape such transfer taxes? This paper addresses how the estate tax influences the c...
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作者：Krasteva, Silvana; Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Duke University
摘要：Evidence suggests little informed giving. To understand this behavior, we examine voluntary provision of a discrete public good with independent private values that can be ascertained at a cost. We find that an individual who considers a smaller contribution is less likely to learn her value, and thus the percentage of informed giving diminishes as the population grows. We also find that a direct grant to the charity exacerbates crowding-out by discouraging information acquisition whereas a ma...
