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作者：Arve, Malin
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：This paper studies the relationship between a financially constrained firm and a stronger opponent who is not cash-constrained when these firms repeatedly compete in a procurement context. We characterize and discuss the procurement agency's optimal strategy when faced with such asymmetric firms. We highlight a trade-off between the long-run benefits from competition and the short-run benefits from reduced costs. Finally, we show that to reduce costs in the short run, the financially weak firm...
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作者：Epple, Dennis; Romano, Richard
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：Two significant challenges hamper the analyses of the collective choice of educational vouchers. One is the multidimensional choice set arising from the interdependence of the voucher, public education spending, and taxation. Second, even absent a voucher, preferences over public spending are not single-peaked; a middling level of public school spending may be less attractive to a household than either high public school spending or private education coupled with low public spending. We show t...
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作者：Hyytinen, Ari; Saarimaa, Tuukka; Tukiainen, Janne
作者单位：University of Jyvaskyla; VATT Institute for Economic Research
摘要：We analyze how anticipated changes in the electoral vulnerability of municipal councilors affect their voting behavior over municipal mergers. The electoral vulnerability changes due to a merger because it changes the composition of political competitors and the number of available seats in the next election. We use this variation for identification and find that the smaller the increase in the electoral vulnerability of a councilor, the more likely he is to vote for the merger. The documented...
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作者：Ujhelyi, Gergely
作者单位：University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要：Civil service rules governing the selection and motivation of bureaucrats are among the defining institutions of modern democracies. Although this is an active area of reform in the US and elsewhere, economic analyses of the issue are virtually nonexistent. This paper provides a welfare evaluation of civil service reform. It describes the effect of reform on the interaction of politicians, voters, and bureaucrats, and shows that society often faces trade-offs between improving the bureaucracy ...
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作者：Andersen, Jorgen Juel; Fiva, Jon H.; Natvik, Gisle James
作者单位：BI Norwegian Business School; Norges Bank
摘要：Most theories of voter behavior predict that electoral participation will be higher in elections where more is at stake. We test this prediction by studying how participation is affected by exogenous variation in local governments' financial flexibility to provide pork for their voters. Utilizing simultaneous elections for different offices, we identify a positive effect of election stakes on participation: Higher stakes at the local level increase participation at the local relative to the re...
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作者：Boleslavsky, Raphael; Kelly, David L.
作者单位：University of Miami
摘要：We consider a two period model of optimal regulation of a firm subject to marginal compliance cost shocks. The regulator faces an asymmetric information problem: the firm knows current compliance costs, but the regulator does not. Both the regulator and the firm are uncertain about future costs. In our basic framework, the regulator may not offer payments to the firm; we show that the regulator can vary the strength of regulation over time to induce the firm to reveal its costs and increase we...
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作者：Enikolopov, Ruben
作者单位：Barcelona School of Economics; Pompeu Fabra University; ICREA; New Economic School
摘要：The paper argues that for political reasons elected politicians are more likely to be engaged in targeted redistribution than appointed bureaucrats. It uses the example of patronage jobs in the U.S. local governments to provide empirical support for this claim. It shows that the number of public employees is higher for elected chief executives. This difference is stronger in public services with bigger private-public wage differential and it increases during election years. It also finds that ...
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作者：Guererk, Oezguer; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rockenbach, Bettina
作者单位：RWTH Aachen University; University of Cologne; University of Cologne
摘要：Economic interactions often take place in open communities, where agents are free to leave in order to join a more preferred community. Tiebout (1956) conjectured that voting with feet might generate considerable efficiency gains, since individuals with different preferences sort themselves into those communities that suit them most. We provide new empirical insights into Tiebout's intuition by showing that self-selection in open heterogeneous communities can significantly foster communities' ...
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作者：Agranov, Marina; Tergiman, Chloe
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of British Columbia
摘要：One of the most robust phenomena in the experimental literature on multilateral bargaining is the failure of proposers to extract equilibrium rents. However, all previous experiments have overlooked the fact that outside the lab committee members are allowed to - and do - engage in sometimes intense communication processes prior to voting on a proposal. We conduct an experimental test of the Baron-Ferejohn model in which we allow committee members to engage in unrestricted cheap-talk communica...
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作者：Fernandez-Huertas Moraga, Jesus; Rapoport, Hillel
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Paris School of Economics; Bar Ilan University
摘要：International migration is maybe the single most effective way to alleviate global poverty. When a given host country allows more immigrants in, this creates costs and benefits for that particular country as well as a positive externality for individuals and governments who care about world poverty. Host countries quite often restrict immigration due to its important social and political costs, however these costs are never measured and made comparable across countries. In this paper we first ...
