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作者:Payne, A. Abigail
作者单位:McMaster University
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作者:Miyagiwa, Kaz; Sato, Yasuhiro
作者单位:State University System of Florida; Florida International University; University of Osaka
摘要:This paper examines the optimal entry policy toward oligopoly in a global economy. We show that free entry results in too much competition for the world, but each country's corrective tax policy, unless internationally coordinated, proves suboptimal because of international policy spillovers. Thus, globalization prevents countries from pursuing the optimal entry policy. However, globalization also generates the gains from trade. When countries are small, the gains from trade dominate the losse...
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作者:[Anonymous]
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作者:de Meza, David; Xie, Gang
作者单位:University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要:Some risky activities are optional, for example motoring. Participation in them is most attractive for good risks, creating a tendency for advantageous selection in the associated insurance market. Taxing insurance consequently yields deadweight gains when type is hidden. Results are strengthened if optimism is present. Finally, endogenising participation implies that the standard positive correlation test for the presence of policy relevant asymmetric information may fail. (C) 2014 Elsevier B...
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作者:Boomhower, Judson; Davis, Lucas W.
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要:Economists have long argued that many recipients of energy-efficiency subsidies may be non-additional, getting paid to do what they would have done anyway. Demonstrating this empirically has been difficult, however, because of endogeneity concerns and other challenges. In this paper we use a regression discontinuity analysis to examine participation in a large-scale residential energy-efficiency program. Comparing behavior just on either side of several eligibility thresholds, we find that pro...
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作者:Johannesen, Niels
作者单位:University of Copenhagen
摘要:Bank deposits in offshore financial centers may be used to evade taxes on interest income. A recent EU reform limits the scope for this type of tax evasion by introducing a withholding tax on interest income earned by EU households in Switzerland and several other offshore centers. This paper estimates the impact of the withholding tax on Swiss bank deposits held by EU residents while using non-EU residents who were not subject to the tax as a comparison group. We present evidence that Swiss b...
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作者:Coviello, Decio; Mariniello, Mario
作者单位:Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal
摘要:We document whether and how publicizing a public procurement auction causally affects entry and the costs of procurement. We run a regression discontinuity design analysis on a large database of Italian procurement auctions. Auctions with a value above the threshold must be publicized in the Regional Official Gazette and two provincial newspapers. We find that the increased publicity requirement induces more entry and higher winning rebates, which reduces the costs of procurement and rationali...
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作者:Hasegawa, Makoto; Salant, Stephen
作者单位:National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要:Virtually every analysis of cap-and-trade programs assumes that firms must surrender permits as they pollute. However, no program, existing or proposed, requires such continual compliance. Some (e.g. the Acid Rain Program limiting SO2 emissions) require compliance once a year; others (e.g. the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative limiting CO2 emissions) require compliance every three years. The paths of emissions and permit prices would be invariant to compliance timing (Holland-Moore, 2013) if ...
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作者:Sorensen, Peter Birch
作者单位:University of Copenhagen
摘要:The paper develops a simple general equilibrium framework for calculating the marginal deadweight loss from taxation in a small open economy. The framework allows a decomposition of the deadweight loss from each tax instrument into the losses stemming from the contraction of the different tax bases. The paper describes a method of calibrating the model which exploits the links between the various factor supply elasticities implied by the standard life cycle model. It also presents a method of ...
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作者:Glaeser, Edward L.; Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
作者单位:Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要:Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the form of pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model in which politicians compete for taxpayers' and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of promised compensation. If pension packages are shrouded, so that public-sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers, then compensation will be highly back-l...