-
作者：Dickinson, David L.; Masclet, David; Villeval, Marie Claire
作者单位：University of North Carolina; Appalachian State University; Universite de Rennes; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; Chapman University System; Chapman University; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Universite de Montreal
摘要：Do individuals trained in law enforcement punish or reward differently from typical student-subjects? We analyze norm enforcement behavior of newly appointed police commissioners in both a game with positive externalities (based on a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism) and a similar game with negative externalities. Depending on the treatment, a reward or sanction institution is either exogenously or endogenously implemented. Police commissioners cooperate significantly more in both games and be...
-
作者：Barr, Andrew; Turner, Sarah
作者单位：University of Virginia; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The Great Recession brought large increases in unemployment and college enrollment; we examine how changing state labor market conditions and state-specific variation in Unemployment Insurance (UI) interact to affect enrollment outcomes. We identify a substantial role of the UI program in affecting post-secondary enrollment choices. We provide some of the first evidence that the duration of UI affects a displaced individual's propensity to enroll, and suggestive evidence that these effects are...
-
作者：Hindriks, Jean; Nishimura, Yukihiro
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain; University of Osaka
摘要：This paper reexamines the work of Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (J. Pub. Econ. 94: 768-776, 2010), which shows that leadership by the small region is the risk dominant equilibrium under the endogenous timing game. They obtained this result in a model where the asymmetry among regions translates into different gradients of the demand for capital but identical vertical intercepts. In this paper, we simply reverse the form of asymmetry by considering different vertical intercepts but identical gradient...
-
作者：Michaeli, Moti; Spiro, Daniel
作者单位：European University Institute; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Oslo
摘要：This paper studies the aggregate distribution of declared opinions and behavior when heterogeneous individuals make the trade-off between being true to their private opinions and conforming to a social norm. The model sheds light on how various sanctioning regimes induce conformity and by whom, and on phenomena such as societal polarization and unimodal concentration. In strict societies, individuals will tend to either fully conform to the social norm or totally ignore it, while individuals i...
-
作者：Li, Bei; Zhang, Jie
作者单位：University of Western Australia; Chongqing University; National University of Singapore
摘要：We investigate whether the pay-as-you-use principle of public finance should apply to education subsidization for children to internalize human capital externalities in an intergenerational model with endogenous fertility, leisure, and accumulations of human and physical capital. We characterize social optimality concerning physical and human capital accumulation, leisure, labor, and fertility to guide the design of efficient education subsidization. We show that efficient education subsidizat...
-
作者：Sanchez Villalba, Miguel
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University
摘要：In the tax evasion game - a typical example of inspection game - audits are costly and audit probabilities are determined by the tax agency based on the tax returns submitted by taxpayers. We find that if taxpayers' incomes are correlated (e.g., when they are subject to a common shock) the optimal audit probability for low declarations is an increasing function of the average declaration, as the latter is an informative signal of the realized level of income. Since a taxpayer's optimal declara...
-
作者：Feltovich, Nick; Giovannoni, Francesco
作者单位：Monash University; University of Bristol
摘要：We examine retrospective- and prospective-voting considerations in an experiment implementing a simple voting model. In each period, the official chooses how much rent to appropriate from a social endowment. Announcement of this choice is followed by an election between the official and a randomly selected challenger, with the winner becoming the official in the next period. We vary two features of the setting: (a) the discount factor, and (b) whether candidates can make costless, non-binding ...
-
作者：Knowles, Stephen; Servatka, Maros
作者单位：University of Otago; University of Canterbury; Macquarie University; University of Economics Bratislava
摘要：We conduct a laboratory experiment to study whether giving people more time to donate to charity reduces donations. People may intend to donate, but because of the transaction costs of doing so, postpone making the payment until they are less busy, and having postponed making the donation once, keep postponing. We conjecture that transaction costs will have a greater effect on donations if the solicitation is received when the opportunity cost of time is high. We find evidence of a transaction...
-
作者：Lockwood, Benjamin B.; Weinzierl, Matthew
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The prominent but unproven intuition that preference heterogeneity reduces redistribution in a standard optimal tax model is shown to hold under the plausible condition that the distribution of preferences for consumption relative to leisure rises, in terms of first-order stochastic dominance, with income. Given familiar functional form assumptions on utility and the distributions of ability and preferences, a simple statistic for the effect of preference heterogeneity on marginal tax rates is...
-
作者：Boehm, Sebastian; Grossmann, Volker; Steger, Thomas M.
作者单位：University of Fribourg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of London; University College London; Leipzig University; Leibniz Association; Leibniz Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)
摘要：The paper revisits the debate on trickle-down growth in view of the widely discussed changes in the distribution of earnings and income that followed a massive expansion of higher education. We propose a dynamic general equilibrium model to dynamically evaluate whether economic growth triggered by an increase in public education expenditure on behalf of those with high learning ability eventually trickles down to low-ability workers and serves them better than redistribution through labor inco...
