Transaction costs, the opportunity cost of time and procrastination in charitable giving

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Knowles, Stephen; Servatka, Maros
• 署名单位: University of Otago; University of Canterbury; Macquarie University; University of Economics Bratislava
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.03.001
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 54-63
• 关键词: Charitable giving; dictator game; transaction costs; Opportunity cost of time; procrastination; Inattention

摘要

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study whether giving people more time to donate to charity reduces donations. People may intend to donate, but because of the transaction costs of doing so, postpone making the payment until they are less busy, and having postponed making the donation once, keep postponing. We conjecture that transaction costs will have a greater effect on donations if the solicitation is received when the opportunity cost of time is high. We find evidence of a transaction cost reducing donations, with the size of this effect depending on the opportunity cost of time, but no statistically significant evidence that giving people more time to donate increases procrastination and thus reduces donations. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.