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作者：Awaya, Yu; Krishna, Vijay
作者单位：University of Rochester; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：Antitrust authorities view the exchange of information among firms regarding costs, prices, or sales as anticompetitive. Such exchanges allow competitors to closely monitor each other, thereby facilitating collusion. But the exchange of aggregate information, perhaps via a third party, is legal. The logic is that collusion is difficult if the identity of a price-cutting firm cannot be ascertained. Here, we examine this logic using Stigler's model of secret price cuts. We first identify circums...
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作者：Flynn, Zach
摘要：Economists typically model a plant's productivity as an exogenous characteristic, but the people who run and work at manufacturing plants make choices, at a cost, that affect plant productivity. I develop a method to partially identify the productivity distribution when such choices determine productivity. The method uses a monotone comparative static result I prove in a general economic model. It does not require instruments or timing assumptions. I use the method to study the effect of imple...
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作者：Kuhn, Jeffrey; Younge, Kenneth; Marco, Alan
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：Many studies rely on patent citations to measure intellectual heritage and impact. In this article, we show that the nature of patent citations has changed dramatically in recent years. Today, a small minority of patent applications are generating a large majority of patent citations, and the mean technological similarity between citing and cited patents has fallen considerably. We replicate several well-known studies in industrial organization and innovation economics and demonstrate how gene...
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作者：Hinnosaar, Toomas; Kawai, Keiichi
作者单位：University of Nottingham; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：Before purchase, a buyer of an experience good learns about the product's fit using various information sources, including some of which the seller may be unaware of. The buyer, however, can conclusively learn the fit only after purchasing and trying out the product. We show that the seller can use a simple mechanism to take best advantage of the buyer's post-purchase learning to maximize his guaranteed-profit. We show that this mechanism combines a generous refund, which performs well when th...
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作者：Anderson, Simon P.; Erkal, Nisvan; Piccinin, Daniel
作者单位：University of Virginia; University of Melbourne
摘要：We compile an IO toolkit for aggregative games with positive and normative comparative statics results for asymmetric oligopoly in the short and long run. We characterize the class of aggregative Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly games, and the subset for which the aggregate is a summary statistic for consumer welfare. We close the model with a monopolistically competitive fringe for long-run analysis. Remarkably, we show strong neutrality properties in the long run across a wide range of market ...
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作者：Halaburda, Hanna; Jullien, Bruno; Yehezkel, Yaron
作者单位：New York University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We consider dynamic competition among platforms in a market with network externalities. A platform that dominated the market in the previous period becomes focal in the current period, in that agents play the equilibrium in which they join the focal platform whenever such equilibrium exists. Yet when faced with higher-quality competition, can a low-quality platform remain focal? In the finite-horizon case, the unique equilibrium is efficient for patient platforms; with an infinite time horizon...
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作者：Archsmith, James; Gillingham, Kenneth T.; Knittel, Christopher R.; Rapson, David S.
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Yale University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：Roughly three quarters of vehicles are purchased into multi-car households. We study whether households are willing to substitute attributes, such as fuel economy, across vehicles within their portfolio. We develop a novel strategy to separately identify idiosyncratic preferences for an attribute from these within-portfolio effects. Using the universe of household vehicle registration records in California over a 6-year period, we find that two-car households exhibit strong substitution across...
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作者：Rietzke, David; Chen, Yu
作者单位：Lancaster University; University of Graz
摘要：We study a principal-agent model wherein the agent is better informed of the prospects of the project, and the project requires both an observable and unobservable input. We characterize the optimal contracts, and explore the trade-offs between high- and low-powered incentive schemes. We discuss the implications for push and pull programs used to encourage Research and Development (R&D) activity, but our results are relevant in other contexts.
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作者：Wang, Chengsi; Wright, Julian
作者单位：Monash University; National University of Singapore
摘要：We provide a model in which consumers search for firms directly or through platforms. Platforms lower search costs but charge firms for the transactions they facilitate. Platform fees raise the possibility of showrooming, in which consumers search on a platform but then switch and buy directly to take advantage of lower direct prices. In settings like this, search platforms like Booking.com have adopted price parity clauses, requiring firms to offer their best prices on the platform, arguing t...
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作者：Kirkegaard, Rene
作者单位：University of Guelph
摘要：The canonical moral hazard model is extended to allow the agent to face endogenous and noncontractible uncertainty. The agent works for the principal and simultaneously pursues outside rewards. The contract offered by the principal thus manipulates the agent's work-life balance. The participation constraint is slack whenever it is optimal to distort the agent's work-life balance away from life compared to a symmetric-information benchmark. Then, the agent's expected utility is high and he face...
