Push or pull? Performance-pay, incentives, and information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rietzke, David; Chen, Yu
• 署名单位: Lancaster University; University of Graz
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12314
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 301-317
• 关键词: Moral hazard; CONTRACTS; patents; AGENCY; SCOPE; POWER; RISK

摘要

We study a principal-agent model wherein the agent is better informed of the prospects of the project, and the project requires both an observable and unobservable input. We characterize the optimal contracts, and explore the trade-offs between high- and low-powered incentive schemes. We discuss the implications for push and pull programs used to encourage Research and Development (R&D) activity, but our results are relevant in other contexts.