Robust pricing with refunds

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hinnosaar, Toomas; Kawai, Keiichi
• 署名单位: University of Nottingham; University of New South Wales Sydney
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12348
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 1014-1036
• 关键词: advance-purchase discounts; mechanisms; DESIGN

摘要

Before purchase, a buyer of an experience good learns about the product's fit using various information sources, including some of which the seller may be unaware of. The buyer, however, can conclusively learn the fit only after purchasing and trying out the product. We show that the seller can use a simple mechanism to take best advantage of the buyer's post-purchase learning to maximize his guaranteed-profit. We show that this mechanism combines a generous refund, which performs well when the buyer is relatively informed, with non-refundable random discounts, which work well when the buyer is relatively uninformed.