2020

最新文章

• Loss leading with salient thinkers AI翻译
  作者：Inderst, Roman; Obradovits, Martin
  作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt; University of Innsbruck
  摘要：In various countries, competition laws restrict retailers' freedom to sell their products below cost. A common rationale, shared by policymakers, consumer interest groups and brand manufacturers alike, is that such loss leading of products would ultimately lead to a race-to-the-bottom in product quality. Building on Varian's (1980) model of sales, we provide a foundation for this critique, though only when consumers are salient thinkers, putting too much weight on certain product attributes. B...
• Multi-part tariffs and differentiated commodity taxation AI翻译
  作者：D'Annunzio, Anna; Mardan, Mohammed; Russo, Antonio
  作者单位：Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Loughborough University
  摘要：We study commodity taxation in markets where firms, such as Internet Service Providers, energy suppliers, and payment card platforms, adopt multi-part tariffs. We show that ad valorem taxes can correct underprovision and hence increase welfare, provided the government applies differentiated tax rates to the usage and access parts of the tariff. We obtain this result in different settings, including vertically interlinked markets, markets where firms adopt menus of tariffs to screen consumers, ...
• Measuring competition in spatial retail AI翻译
  作者：Ellickson, Paul B.; Grieco, Paul L. E.; Khvastunov, Oleksii
  作者单位：University of Rochester; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
  摘要：We propose and estimate a spatially aggregated discrete-choice model with overlapping consumer choice sets and demographic-driven heterogeneity that varies by chain. Our approach avoids the need to define markets ex ante and captures rich substitution patterns, even in the absence of price data. An application to the US grocery industry illustrates the importance of location, format, and the spatial distribution of consumers in shaping the competitive environment. Contrary to conventional wisd...
• Constrained listening, audience alignment, and expert communication AI翻译
  作者：Fischer, Paul E.; Heinle, Mirko S.; Smith, Kevin C.
  作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Stanford University
  摘要：We consider a cheap-talk setting with two senders and a continuum of receivers with heterogenous preferences. Each receiver is constrained to listen to one of the senders but can choose which sender to listen to. The introduction of a second sender facilitates more informative communication and even enables full communication for a large set of sender preference pairs. We use the model to assess the size and characteristics of sender audiences, the amount of information communicated, and the i...
• Targeted information and limited attention AI翻译
  作者：Hefti, Andreas; Liu, Shuo
  作者单位：Zurich University of Applied Sciences; University of Zurich; Peking University
  摘要：We examine the implications of limited consumer attention for the targeting decisions of competing firms. Limited attention alters the strategic role of information provision as firms may become incentivized to behave as mass advertisers, despite perfect targeting abilities. We analyze the consequences of limited attention for targeting, strategic pricing, market shares, attention competition between firms, and the value of marketing data to firms. Accounting for limited attention in an otherw...
• The demand-boost theory of exclusive dealing AI翻译
  作者：Calzolari, Giacomo; Denicolo, Vincenzo; Zanchetti, Piercarlo
  作者单位：European University Institute; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Bologna; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Leicester
  摘要：This article unifies various approaches to the analysis of exclusive dealing that so far have been regarded as distinct. The common element of these approaches is that firms depart from efficient pricing, raising marginal prices above marginal costs. We show that with distorted prices, exclusive dealing can be directly profitable and anticompetitive provided that the dominant firm enjoys a competitive advantage over rivals. The dominant firm gains directly, rather than in the future, or in adj...
• Learning while setting precedents AI翻译
  作者：Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Huelya
  作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Rice University; University of Osaka
  摘要：A decision maker makes a ruling on a random case in each period. She is uncertain about the correct ruling until conducting a costly investigation. A ruling establishes a precedent, which cannot be violated under binding precedent. We compare the information acquisition incentives, the evolution of standards and the social welfare under nonbinding and binding precedents. Compared to nonbinding precedent, under binding precedent, information acquisition incentives are stronger in earlier period...
• Word-of-mouth communication and search AI翻译
  作者：Campbell, Arthur; Leister, C. Matthew; Zenou, Yves
  作者单位：Monash University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
  摘要：We develop a word-of-mouth search model where information flows from the old to the new generation for an experience good with unknown quality. We study the features of the social network that determine product quality and welfare and characterize the demand-side (under provision of search effort) and supply-side (inefficient entry by firms) factors that result in inefficiencies. One striking result is to show that the more connected but also the less-unequal a friendship network is (in the se...
• The curse of knowledge: having access to customer information can reduce monopoly profits AI翻译
  作者：Laussel, Didier; Long, Ngo, V; Resende, Joana
  作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite; McGill University; Universidade do Porto
  摘要：We show that a monopolist's profit is higher if he refrains from collecting coarse information on his customers, sticking to constant uniform pricing rather than recognizing customers' segments through their purchase history. In the Markov perfect equilibrium with coarse information collection, after each commitment period, a new introductory price is offered to attract new customers, creating a new market segment for price discrimination. Eventually, the whole market is covered. Shortening th...
• Screening soft information: evidence from loan officers AI翻译
  作者：Wang, James
  作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA
  摘要：I evaluate how loan officers screen uncodified, soft information using data from China. After documenting substantial differences in loan decisions and outcomes across loan officers, I develop and estimate a screening model incorporating screening ability and beliefs regarding ability. Estimates imply that the typical loan officer is risk-averse, has heterogeneous screening ability, and behaves overconfidently-behaving as if he or she observes more from soft information than what the data woul...