Aggregative games and oligopoly theory: short-run and long-run analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anderson, Simon P.; Erkal, Nisvan; Piccinin, Daniel
• 署名单位: University of Virginia; University of Melbourne
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12322
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 470-495
• 关键词: monopolistic competition; EFFICIENCY; mergers; entry; TRADE; FIRMS

摘要

We compile an IO toolkit for aggregative games with positive and normative comparative statics results for asymmetric oligopoly in the short and long run. We characterize the class of aggregative Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly games, and the subset for which the aggregate is a summary statistic for consumer welfare. We close the model with a monopolistically competitive fringe for long-run analysis. Remarkably, we show strong neutrality properties in the long run across a wide range of market structures. The results elucidate aggregative games as a unifying principle in the literature on merger analysis, privatization, Stackelberg leadership, and cost shocks.