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作者：Yang, Chenyu
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：This article studies how vertical integration and upstream R&D subsidy affect innovation and welfare in vertically separated industries. I formulate a dynamic structural model of a dominant upstream firm and oligopolistic downstream firms that invest in complementary innovations. I estimate the model using data on the System-on-Chip (SoC) and smartphone industries. The results suggest that a vertical merger can increase innovation and welfare, mainly driven by the investment coordination of th...
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作者：Jeong, Seungwon (Eugene)
作者单位：University of Bristol
摘要：In auctions with externalities, it is well-known that the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of stability and fairness. Nevertheless, some auction outcome must be chosen. We separate deviations into two types: deviations by paying more and deviations by refusing to pay. In high-stakes auctions where bidders also care about their reputation, the latter are unlikely to occur, or else can be prevented by legal interventions. In contrast, the former is more undesirable in the se...
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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; University of London; University College London
摘要：Nonretail platforms enable users to engage in noncommercial activities, while generating user information that helps ad targeting. We present a model in which the platform chooses a personalized ad-display rule and an advertising fee (which depends on the targeted user group). The policy that maximizes the platform's advertising revenues creates an incentive for advertisers to strategize targeting. We provide a condition for incentive-compatibility of the first-best policy, and highlight the f...
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作者：Bevia, Carmen; Corchon, Luis C.; Yasuda, Yosuke
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Osaka
摘要：We model a dynamic duopoly in which firms can potentially drive their rivals from the market. For some parameter values, the Cournot equilibrium outcome cannot be sustained in an infinitely repeated setting. In those cases, there is a Markov perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies in which one firm, eventually, will exit the market with probability one. Producer surplus in the maximum collusive outcome is greater under bankruptcy consideration, because the outcome that maximizes joint profits ...
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作者：Pinkovskiy, Maxim L.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要：The health spending slowdown associated with the managed care revolution in the 1990s suggests that managed care may have been successful in controlling health care spending. I exploit the passage of state regulation during the managed care backlash as well as geographic variation in managed care intensity to measure the impact of managed care on spending. I find that restricting managed care causes a large and significant increase in hospital spending, which cannot be explained by changes in ...
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作者：Bourgeon, Jean-Marc; Picard, Pierre
作者单位：INRAE; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：We analyze how insurance law can mitigate moral hazard by allowing insurers to reduce or cancel coverage in some circumstances. We consider an incomplete contract setting in which the insurer may obtain information related to the policyholder's behavior through a costly audit of the circumstances of the loss. Court decisions are based on a standard of proof such as the balance of probabilities. We show that an optimal insurance law brings efficiency gains compared to the no-audit case. We also...
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作者：Ale-Chilet, Jorge; Atal, Juan Pablo
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We study a recent case where most gynecologists in one city formed a trade association to bargain for better rates with insurance companies. After unsuccessful negotiations, the physicians jointly terminated their insurer contracts and set a minimum price. We find that subsequent realized prices coincided with Nash-Bertrand prices, and that the minimum price was barely binding. We show that these actions ensured the association's stability and increased profits. Our findings shed light on the ...
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作者：Hernandez, Cristian; Quint, Daniel; Turansick, Christopher
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Georgetown University
摘要：We propose a framework for identification and estimation of a private values model with unobserved heterogeneity from bid data in English auctions, using variation in the number of bidders across auctions, and extend the framework to settings where the number of bidders is not cleanly observed in each auction. We illustrate our method on data from eBay Motors auctions. We find that unobserved heterogeneity is important, accounting for two thirds of price variation after controlling for observa...
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作者：Conlon, Christopher; Gortmaker, Jeff
作者单位：New York University; Harvard University
摘要：Differentiated products demand systems are a workhorse for understanding the price effects of mergers, the value of new goods, and the contribution of products to seller networks. Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) provide a flexible random coefficients logit model which accounts for the endogeneity of prices. This article reviews and combines several recent advances related to the estimation of BLP-type problems and implements an extensible generic interface via the PyBLP package. Monte Carlo...
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作者：Gilo, David; Yehezkel, Yaron
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：We characterize collusion involving secret vertical contracts between retailers and their supplier-who are all equally patient (vertical collusion). We show such collusion is easier to sustain than collusion among retailers. Furthermore, vertical collusion can solve the supplier's inability to commit to charging the monopoly wholesale price when retailers are differentiated. The supplier pays retailers slotting allowances as a prize for adhering to the collusive scheme and rejects contract dev...
