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作者：Kong, Yunmi
作者单位：Rice University
摘要：In a government auction program where first-price auctions generate significantly higher revenue than English auctions, I document evidence that bidders are uncertain about the number of auction entrants. Motivated by additional data evidence, I estimate a structural model of auctions in which rivals' participation is stochastic, allowing for bidders' risk aversion and asymmetry. Counterfactual simulations reveal that bidders' uncertainty about the number of entrants, combined with risk aversi...
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作者：Salz, Tobias; Vespa, Emanuel
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：We evaluate standard assumptions in the estimation of dynamic oligopoly models with laboratory data. Using an entry/exit game, we estimate structural parameters under the assumption that the data are generated by a Markov-perfect equilibrium and subsequently predict counterfactual behavior. If behavior was collusive, however, the assumption would be violated and one would mispredict counterfactuals. The laboratory allows us to compare predicted behavior to true counterfactuals implemented as t...
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作者：Lee, Jungho
作者单位：Singapore Management University
摘要：I estimate a matching model of business-partnership formation to quantify the relative importance of productivity gains, financing gains, and the coordination failure of effort provision (moral hazard) among partners. Productivity gains account for 61% of the gain from the observed partnerships. For partners in the first quartile of the wealth distribution, however, financing accounts for 93% of the gain. The cost of moral hazard corresponds to 42% of the entire gain from partnerships. A loan ...
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作者：Hua, Xinyu; Spier, Kathryn E.
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：A firm sells a dangerous product to heterogeneous consumers. Higher consumer types suffer accidents more often but may enjoy higher gross benefits. The firm invests resources to reduce the frequency of accidents. When the consumer's net benefit function (gross benefits minus expected harms) is decreasing in consumer type, the firm contractually accepts liability for accident losses and invests efficiently. When the consumer's net benefit function is increasing in consumer type, the firm contra...
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作者：Barbieri, Stefano; Konrad, Kai A.; Malueg, David A.
作者单位：Tulane University; Max Planck Society; University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要：We consider a preemption game between competing groups; firms lobbying individually for their groups' interests provide an empirical example. Among symmetric groups, the first firm to take action bears an (unobserved) cost and wins the prize on behalf of its group. In equilibrium, the firm with the lowest cost takes action, but with delay. More competition and a smaller ratio of costs to benefits reduce delay. Firms in larger groups wait longer, but group action can occur earlier, as the proba...
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作者：Asker, John; Fershtman, Chaim; Jeon, Jihye; Pakes, Ariel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research; Tel Aviv University; Boston University; Harvard University
摘要：This article develops a computational framework to analyze dynamic auctions and uses it to investigate the impact of information sharing among bidders. We show that allowing for the dynamics implicit in many auction environments enables the emergence of equilibrium states that can only be reached when firms are responding to dynamic incentives. The impact of information sharing depends on the extent of dynamics and provides support for the claim that information sharing, even of strategically ...
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作者：Biglaiser, Gary; Li, Fei; Murry, Charles; Zhou, Yiyi
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Boston College; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：We present empirical evidence supporting that used cars sold by dealers have higher quality: (i) dealer transaction prices are higher than unmediated market prices, and this dealer premium increases in the age of the car as a ratio and is hump-shaped in dollar value, and (ii) used cars purchased from dealers are less likely to be resold. In a model, we show that these empirical facts can be rationalized either when dealers alleviate information asymmetry, or when dealers facilitate assortative...
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作者：Marshall, Guillermo
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：Firms often choose not to post prices in wholesale markets, and buyers must incur costs to discover prices. Inspired by evidence of customized pricing (e.g., some customers pay up to 70% more than others) and search costs, I estimate a search model to study how personalized pricing impacts efficiency in a wholesale market. I find that price discrimination decreases total surplus by 11.6% and increases the sellers' profits by up to 52.1%. These effects are partially explained by price discrimin...
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作者：de Roos, Nicolas; Smirnov, Vladimir
作者单位：University of Sydney
摘要：We develop a theory of optimal collusive intertemporal price dispersion. Dispersion clouds consumer price awareness, encouraging firms to coordinate on dispersed prices. Our theory generates a collusive rationale for price cycles and sales. Patient firms can support optimal collusion at the monopoly price. For less patient firms, monopoly prices must be punctuated with fleeting sales. The most robust structure involves price cycles that resemble Edgeworth cycles. Low consumer attentiveness enh...
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作者：Choi, Jay Pil; Mukherjee, Arijit
作者单位：Michigan State University; Yonsei University
摘要：We explore the optimal disclosure policy of a certification intermediary where (i) the seller decides on entry and investment in product quality, and (ii) the buyers observe an additional public signal on quality. The optimal policy maximizes rent extraction from the seller by trading off incentives for entry and investment. We identify conditions under which full, partial or no disclosure can be optimal. The intermediary's report becomes noisier as the public signal gets more precise, but if ...
