Information exchange in cartels

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Awaya, Yu; Krishna, Vijay
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12320
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 421-446
• 关键词: Repeated games; COMMUNICATION; collusion; EFFICIENCY

摘要

Antitrust authorities view the exchange of information among firms regarding costs, prices, or sales as anticompetitive. Such exchanges allow competitors to closely monitor each other, thereby facilitating collusion. But the exchange of aggregate information, perhaps via a third party, is legal. The logic is that collusion is difficult if the identity of a price-cutting firm cannot be ascertained. Here, we examine this logic using Stigler's model of secret price cuts. We first identify circumstances such that when no information exchange is possible, collusion is difficult. We then show that if firms' aggregate sales are made public, nearly perfect collusion is possible.