Screening for breakthroughs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Curello, Gregorio; Sinander, Ludvig
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE6247
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Dynamic mechanism design; unemployment-insurance; INFORMATION; disclosure; constraints; COMMITMENT; liquidity; deadlines; ARRIVALS; price

摘要

How best to incentivize prompt disclosure? We study this question in a general model in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivize disclosure via her control of a payoff-relevant physical allocation. We uncover a deadline structure of optimal mechanisms: they have a simple deadline form in an important special case, and a graduated deadline structure in general. We apply our results to the design of unemployment insurance schemes.