Bayesian games with nested information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jacobovic, Royi; Levy, Yehuda John; Solan, Eilon
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; University of Glasgow
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE6461
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Nash equilibrium; incomplete information; dynkin game; EXISTENCE; pure; Measurability; strategies; QUALITY

摘要

A Bayesian game is said to have nested information if the players are ordered and each player knows the types of all players that follow her in that order. We prove that all multiplayer Bayesian games with finite action spaces, bounded payoffs, Polish type spaces, and nested information admit a Bayesian equilibrium.