Commonality of information and commonality of beliefs
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Awaya, Yu; Krishna, Vijay
署名单位:
University of Rochester; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
刊物名称:
THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN:
1933-6837
DOI:
10.3982/TE6256
发表日期:
2025
关键词:
robustness
摘要:
A group of agents with a common prior receive informative signals about an unknown state repeatedly over time. If these signals were public, agents' beliefs would be identical and commonly known. This suggests that if signals were private, then the more correlated they are, the greater is the commonality of beliefs. We show that, in fact, the opposite may be true. In the long run, conditionally independent signals may achieve greater commonality of beliefs than correlated signals.