Optimally stubborn. How long to hold and who will fold?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sanktjohanser, Anna
• 署名单位: Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE5977
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Reputation; INFORMATION; COSTS

摘要

I consider a model of reputational bargaining in which the stubborn type can choose their initial demand. There are two types of players: rational and stubborn. The game has two stages: a demand stage and a concession stage. Types can pool or separate in equilibrium for any fixed probability of facing a stubborn type. When the probability of facing a stubborn type is small, any feasible payoff can be achieved in equilibrium for either type. When the probability is large, there is either immediate agreement or long delays.