Evidence and skepticism in verifiable disclosure games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rappoport, Daniel
• 署名单位: Georgetown University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE5423
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: information; persuasion; product

摘要

A key feature of communication with evidence is skepticism: a receiver will attribute any incomplete disclosure to the sender concealing unfavorable evidence. I study when a change in the receivers prior belief about the sender's evidence induces more skepticism, i.e., induces the receiver, regardless of his preferences, to take an equilibrium action that is less favorable for the sender following every message. I provide a definition of when one receiver's prior belief expects more evidence than another and show that this characterizes more skepticism. As an input, I fully characterize receiver optimal equilibrium outcomes in general verifiable disclosure games.