Costly verification in collective decisions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Erlanson, Albin; Kleiner, Andreas
• 署名单位: University of Essex; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE3101
• 发表日期: 2020-07-01
• 页码: 923-954
• 关键词: Collective decision; costly verification; D71; D82

摘要

We study how a principal should optimally choose between implementing a new policy and maintaining the status quo when information relevant for the decision is privately held by agents. Agents are strategic in revealing their information; the principal cannot use monetary transfers to elicit this information, but can verify an agent's claim at a cost. We characterize the mechanism that maximizes the expected utility of the principal. This mechanism can be implemented as a cardinal voting rule, in which agents can either cast a baseline vote, indicating only whether they are in favor of the new policy, or make specific claims about their type. The principal gives more weight to specific claims and verifies a claim whenever it is decisive.