School choice with asymmetric information: Priority design and the curse of acceptance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kloosterman, Andrew; Troyan, Peter
• 署名单位: University of Virginia
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE3621
• 发表日期: 2020-07-01
• 页码: 1095-1133
• 关键词: Matching; STABILITY; asymmetric information; C78; D47

摘要

We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and differentially informed students. We show that, in general, the commonly used deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy-proof, the outcome is not stable, and may make less informed students worse off. We attribute these results to acurse of acceptance. However, we also show that if priorities are designed appropriately, positive results are recovered: equilibrium strategies are simple, the outcome is stable, and less informed students are protected from the curse of acceptance. Our results have implications for the current debate over priority design in school choice.