Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: He Wei; Sun Yeneng
• 署名单位: Chinese University of Hong Kong; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE2927
• 发表日期: 2020-05-01
• 页码: 811-859
• 关键词: Dynamic games; perfect information; almost perfect information; subgame-perfect equilibrium; atomless transition; atomless reference measure; C62; C73

摘要

This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite- or infinite-horizon dynamic games with complete information. Under some mild conditions, we prove the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria and the upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium payoffs in general dynamic games with simultaneous moves (i.e., almost perfect information), which go beyond previous works in the sense that stagewise public randomization and the continuity requirement on the state variables are not needed. For alternating move (i.e., perfect-information) dynamic games with uncertainty, we show the existence of pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria as well as the upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium payoffs, extending the earlier results on perfect-information deterministic dynamic games.