The wisdom of the crowd in dynamic economies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dindo, Pietro; Massari, Filippo
• 署名单位: Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Bocconi University; University of East Anglia
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE3924
• 发表日期: 2020-11-01
• 页码: 1627-1668
• 关键词: Wisdom of the crowd; heterogeneous beliefs; market selection hypothesis; naive learning

摘要

The wisdom of the crowd applied to financial markets asserts that prices represent a consensus belief that is more accurate than individual beliefs. However, a market selection argument implies that prices eventually reflect only the beliefs of the most accurate agent. In this paper, we show how to reconcile these alternative points of view. In markets in which agents naively learn from equilibrium prices, a dynamic wisdom of the crowd holds. Market participation increases agents' accuracy, and equilibrium prices are more accurate than the most accurate agent.