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作者：Olszewski, Wojciech; Siegel, Ron
作者单位：Northwestern University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We provide conditions that simplify applying Reny's (1999) better-reply security to Bayesian games and use these conditions to prove the existence of equilibria for classes of games in which payoff discontinuities arise only at ties. These games include a general version of all-pay contests, first-prize auctions with common values, and Hotelling models with incomplete information.
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov; Smorodinsky, Rann; Yamashita, Takuro
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：Mean-preserving contractions are critical for studying Bayesian models of information design. We introduce the class of bi-pooling policies, and the class of bi-pooling distributions as their induced distributions over posteriors. We show that every extreme point in the set of all mean-preserving contractions of any given prior over an interval takes the form of a bi-pooling distribution. By implication, every Bayesian persuasion problem with an interval state space admits an optimal bi-poolin...
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作者：Perez-Nievas, Mikel
作者单位：Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
摘要：Fertility rates are declining in many countries. But are fertility rates inefficiently low? This paper addresses this question by exploring the efficiency properties of equilibria in an overlapping generations setting with endogenous fertility and dynastic parental altruism, using the notion of P-efficiency proposed by Golosov, Jones and Tertilt (2007). In contrast to Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2014), who show that any equilibrium for which nonnegativity constraints on intergenerational transfe...
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作者：Denti, Tommaso
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：In many strategic environments, information acquisition is a central component of the game that is played. Being uncertain about a payoff-relevant state, a player in a game has a twofold incentive to acquire information: learning the state and learning what others know. We develop a model of information acquisition in games that accounts for players' incentive to learn what others know. In applications to rational inattention and global games, we prove the power of this incentive. When informa...
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作者：Manjunath, Vikram; Morrill, Thayer
作者单位：University of Ottawa; North Carolina State University
摘要：Many centralized matching markets are preceded by interviews between participants, including the residency matches between doctors and hospitals. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, interviews in the National Resident Matching Program were switched to a virtual format, which resulted in a dramatic and asymmetric decrease in the cost of accepting interview invitations. We study the impact of an increase in the number of doctors' interviews on their final matches. We show analytically that if doctors ...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Lanzani, Giacomo
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We use an evolutionary model to determine which misperceptions can persist. Every period, a new generation of agents use their subjective models and the data generated by the previous generation to update their beliefs, and models that induce better actions become more prevalent. An equilibrium can resist mutations that lead agents to use a model that better fits the equilibrium data but induce the mutated agents to take an action with lower payoffs. We characterize which steady states resist ...
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作者：Feng, Tangren; Niemeyer, Axel; Wu, Qinggong
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; University of Bonn; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We study ex post implementation in collective decision problems where monetary transfers cannot be used. We find that deterministic ex post implementation is impossible if the underlying environment is neither almost an environment with private values nor almost one with common values. Thus, desirable properties of ex post implementation such as informational robustness become difficult to achieve when preference interdependence and preference heterogeneity are both present in the environment.
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作者：Xiong, Siyang
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要：We provide a complete answer regarding what social choice functions can be rationalizably implemented.
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作者：Foster, Dean P.; Hart, Sergiu
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Amazon.com; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：To identify expertise, forecasters should not be tested by their calibration score, which can always be made arbitrarily small, but rather by their Brier score. The Brier score is the sum of the calibration score and the refinement score; the latter measures how good the sorting into bins with the same forecast is, and thus attests to expertise. This raises the question of whether one can gain calibration without losing expertise, which we refer to as calibeating. We provide an easy way to cal...
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作者：Kikuchi, Kazuya; Koriyama, Yukio
作者单位：Tokyo University of Foreign Studies; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris
摘要：We consider collective decision-making when society consists of groups endowed with voting weights. Each group chooses an internal rule that specifies the allocation of its weight to alternatives as a function of its members' preferences. Under fairly general conditions, we show that the winner-take-all rule is a dominant strategy, while the equilibrium is Pareto dominated, highlighting the dilemma structure between optimality for each group and for the whole society. We also develop a techniq...
