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作者：Condorelli, Daniele; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：University of Warwick; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We characterize equilibria of oligopolistic markets where identical firms with constant marginal cost compete a la Cournot. For given maximal willingness to pay and maximal total demand, we first identify all combinations of equilibrium consumer surplus and industry profit that can arise from arbitrary demand functions. Then, as a further restriction, we fix the average willingness to pay above marginal cost (i.e., first-best surplus) and identify all possible triples of consumer surplus, indu...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Koren, Moran; Smorodinsky, Rann
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Tel Aviv University
摘要：Two firms produce substitute goods of unknown quality. At each stage the firms set prices and a consumer with private information and unit demand buys from one of the firms. Both firms and consumers see the entire history of prices and purchases. Will such markets aggregate information? Will the firm with the superior product necessarily prevail? We adapt the classic social-learning model by introducing strategic dynamic pricing. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for asymptotic le...
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作者：Gensbittel, Fabien; Peski, Marcin; Renault, Jerome
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; University of Toronto
摘要：We define the distance between two information structures as the largest possible difference in value across all zero-sum games. We provide a tractable characterization of distance and use it to discuss the relation between the value of information in games versus single-agent problems, the value of additional information, informational substitutes, complements, or joint information. The convergence to a countable information structure under value-based distance is equivalent to the weak conve...
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作者：Kosterina, Svetlana
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：A sender designs an information structure to persuade a receiver to take an action. The sender is ignorant about the receiver's prior, and evaluates each information structure using the receiver's prior that is the worst for the sender. I characterize the optimal information structures in this environment. I show that there exists an optimal signal with two realizations, characterize the support of the signal realization recommending approval,, and show that the optimal signal is a hyperbola. ...
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作者：Balbus, Lukasz; Dziewulski, Pawel; Reffett, Kevin; Wozny, Lukasz
作者单位：University of Zielona Gora; University of Sussex; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Warsaw School of Economics
摘要：We present a new approach to studying equilibrium dynamics in a class of stochastic games with a continuum of players with private types and strategic complementarities. We introduce a suitable equilibrium concept, called Markov Stationary Nash Distributional Equilibrium (MSNDE), prove its existence, and determine comparative statics of equilibrium paths and the steady-state invariant distributions to which they converge. Finally, we provide numerous applications of our results including: dyna...
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作者：Antinolfi, Gaetano; Carapella, Francesca; Carli, Francesco
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; Deakin University
摘要：This paper studies the optimal clearing arrangement for bilateral financial contracts in which an assessment of counterparty credit risk is crucial for efficiency. The economy is populated by borrowers and lenders. Borrowers are subject to limited commitment and hold private information about the severity of such lack of commitment. Lenders can acquire information, at a cost, about the commitment of their borrowers, which affects the assessment of counterparty risk. Clearing through a central ...
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作者：Mekonnen, Teddy; Leal Vizcaino, Rene
作者单位：Brown University; Bank of Mexico
摘要：We study how changes to the informativeness of signals in Bayesian games and single-agent decision problems affect the distribution of equilibrium actions. Focusing on supermodular environments, we provide conditions under which a more precise private signal for one agent leads to an increasing-mean spread or a decreasing-mean spread of equilibrium actions for all agents. We apply our comparative statics to information disclosure games between a sender and many receivers and derive sufficient ...
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作者：Nikzad, Afshin
作者单位：University of Southern California
摘要：We prove that in a market where agents rank objects independently and uniformly at random, there exists an assignment of objects to agents with a constant average rank (i.e., an average rank independent of the market size). The proof builds on techniques from random graph theory and the FKG inequality (Fortuin et al. (1971)). When the agents' rankings are their private information, no Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible mechanism can implement the assignment with the smallest average rank; ...
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作者：Gilboa, Itzhak; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Yale University
摘要：Decision theory can be used to test the logic of decision making-one may ask whether a given set of decisions can be justified by a decision-theoretic model. Indeed, in principal-agent settings, such justifications may be required-a manager of an investment fund may be asked what beliefs she used when valuing assets and a government may be asked whether a portfolio of rules and regulations is coherent. In this paper we ask which collections of uncertain-act evaluations can be simultaneously ju...
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作者：Ekmekci, Mehmet; Lauermann, Stephan
作者单位：Boston College; University of Bonn
摘要：The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have common interests, elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any equilibrium. Here, we study the performance of large elections with population uncertainty. We find that the modern Condorcet jury theorem holds if and only if the expected number of voters is independent of the state. If the expected number of voters depends on the state, then additional equilibria exist in which info...
