Equilibrium existence in games with ties

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Olszewski, Wojciech; Siegel, Ron
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE5067
• 发表日期: 2023-05-01
• 页码: 481-502
• 关键词: Equilibrium existence; discontinuous games; better-reply security; C72; D44; D82; L13

摘要

We provide conditions that simplify applying Reny's (1999) better-reply security to Bayesian games and use these conditions to prove the existence of equilibria for classes of games in which payoff discontinuities arise only at ties. These games include a general version of all-pay contests, first-prize auctions with common values, and Hotelling models with incomplete information.