The limits of ex post implementation without transfers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Feng, Tangren; Niemeyer, Axel; Wu, Qinggong
• 署名单位: Bocconi University; Bocconi University; University of Bonn; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE4915
• 发表日期: 2023-05-01
• 页码: 463-479
• 关键词: Ex post implementation; interdependent values; nontransferable utility; mechanism design; collective decision-making; informational robustness; D71; D82

摘要

We study ex post implementation in collective decision problems where monetary transfers cannot be used. We find that deterministic ex post implementation is impossible if the underlying environment is neither almost an environment with private values nor almost one with common values. Thus, desirable properties of ex post implementation such as informational robustness become difficult to achieve when preference interdependence and preference heterogeneity are both present in the environment.