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作者：Hendricks, Kenneth; Wiseman, Thomas
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We characterize an optimal mechanism for a seller with one unit of a good facing N >= 3 buyers and a single competitor who sells another identical unit in a second-price auction. Buyers who do not get the seller's good compete in the competitor's subsequent auction. The mechanism features transfers from buyers with the two highest valuations, allocation to the buyer with the second-highest valuation, and an allocation rule that depends on the two highest valuations. It can be implemented by a ...
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作者：Dur, Umut; Morrill, Thayer; Phan, William
作者单位：North Carolina State University
摘要：We introduce a generalization of the school choice problem motivated by the following observations: students are assigned to grades within schools, many students have siblings who are applying as well, and school districts commonly guarantee that siblings will attend the same school. This last condition disqualifies the standard approach of considering grades independently as it may separate siblings. We argue that the central criterion in school choice-elimination of justified envy-is now ina...
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作者：Fulton, Chad
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：This paper studies static rational inattention problems with multiple actions and multiple shocks. We solve for the optimal signals chosen by agents and provide tools to interpret information processing. By relaxing restrictive assumptions previously used to gain tractability, we allow agents more latitude to choose what to pay attention to. Our applications examine the pricing problem of a monopolist who sells in multiple markets and the portfolio problem of an investor who can invest in mult...
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作者：Cheng, Chen; Xing, Yiqing
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University
摘要：Economic agents care about their relative well-being, and the comparisons are usually local. We capture this using a network model, in which an agent's payoff depends on the ranking of their allocation among their network neighbors. Given a network, an allocation is called alpha-stable if no blocking coalition whose size is an alpha fraction of the population can strictly improve their payoffs. We find a sufficient and necessary condition for a network to permit an alpha-stable allocation: the...
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作者：Zhang, Wenzhang
作者单位：Zhejiang University
摘要：In the context of repeated first-price auctions, we explore how a bid-rigging cartel can simultaneously overcome the difficulty of soliciting truthful private information about valuations and the difficulty of enforcing its internal mechanism. Focusing on the class of trigger-strategy collusive agreements, we explicitly characterize the optimal collusive agreement for any given discount factor. Making use of the characterization, we also explore how a long-run seller can use a reserve price to...
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作者：Martimort, David; Stole, Lars A.
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of Chicago
摘要：We present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a class of optimal control problems with pure state constraints for which the objective function is linear in the state variable but the objective function is only required to be upper semicontinuous in the control variable. We apply those conditions to economic environments in contract theory where discontinuities in objectives prevail. Examples of applications include nonlinear pricing of digital goods and nonlinear pricing under co...
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作者：Schlegel, Jan Christoph
作者单位：City St Georges, University of London
摘要：Several structural results for the set of competitive equilibria in trading networks with frictions are established: The lattice theorem, the rural hospitals theorem, the existence of side-optimal equilibria, and a group-incentive-compatibility result hold with imperfectly transferable utility and in the presence of frictions. While our results are developed in a trading network model, they also imply analogous (and new) results for exchange economies with combinatorial demand and for two-side...
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作者：Blume, Andreas; Park, In-Uck
作者单位：University of Arizona; University of Bristol
摘要：We show that information exchange via disclosure is possible in equilibrium even when it is certain that whenever one party learns the truth, the other loses. The incentive to disclose results either from an expectation of disclosure being reciprocated-the quid pro quo motive-or from the possibility of learning from the rival's failure to act in response to a disclosure-the screening motive. Alternating and gradual disclosures are generally indispensable for information exchange and the number...
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作者：Zhao, Chen
作者单位：University of Hong Kong
摘要：I propose an axiomatic framework for belief revision when new information is qualitative, of the form event A is at least as likely as event B. My decision maker need not have beliefs about the joint distribution of the signal she will receive and the payoff-relevant states. I propose three axioms, Exchangeability, Stationarity, and Reduction, to characterize the class of pseudo-Bayesian updating rules. The key axiom, Exchangeability, requires that the order in which the information arrives do...
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作者：Bird, Daniel; Frug, Alexander
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We develop a framework for deriving dynamic monotonicity results in long-term stochastic contracting problems with symmetric information. Specifically, we construct a notion of concave separable activity that encompasses many prevalent contractual components (e.g., wage, effort, level of production, etc.). We then provide a tight condition under which such activities manifest a form of seniority in every contracting problem in which they are present: any change that occurs in the level of the ...
