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作者：Kaya, Ayca
作者单位：University of Miami
摘要：The founder of a start-up (principal) who has a project with uncertain returns must retain and incentivize an agent using promise of future payments and information gathering. The agent's effort incrementally advances production and such advance is a prerequisite for gathering new information. The principal decides how much information to gather based on these incremental advancements. The principal faces cash constraints. The agent's outside option is large relative to his effort cost. Equili...
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作者：Neyman, Abraham
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：This paper characterizes those preferences over bounded infinite utility streams that satisfy the time value of money principle and an additivity property, and the subset of these preferences that, in addition, are either impatient or patient. Based on this characterization, the paper introduces a concept of optimization that is robust to a small imprecision in the specification of the preference, and proves that the set of feasible streams of payoffs of a finite Markov decision process admits...
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作者：Escude, Matteo; Sinander, Ludvig
作者单位：Luiss Guido Carli University; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a sender provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a decision maker takes an action in each period. Using a novel viscosity dynamic programming principle, we characterize the sender's equilibrium value function and information provision. We show that the graduality constraint inhibits information provision relati...
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作者：Onuchic, Paula; Ray, Debraj
作者单位：University of Oxford; New York University; University of Warwick
摘要：A sender sells an object of unknown quality to a receiver who pays his expected value for it. Sender and receiver might hold different priors over quality. The sender commits to a monotone categorization of quality. We characterize the sender's optimal monotone categorization, the optimality of full pooling or full separation, and make precise a sense in which pooling is dominant relative to separation. As an application, we study the design of a grading scheme by an educational institution th...
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作者：Segal, Uzi
作者单位：Boston College
摘要：This paper shows that in some axioms regarding the mixture of random variables, the requirement that the conclusions hold for all values of the mixture parameter can be weakened by requiring the existence of only one nontrivial value of the parameter, which need not be fixed. This is the case for the independence, betweenness, and mixture symmetry axioms. Unlike the standard axioms, these weaker versions cannot be refuted by experimental methods.
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作者：Can, Burak; Pourpouneh, Mohsen; Storcken, Ton
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Oxford; University of Copenhagen; Maastricht University
摘要：Matchings in a market may have varying degrees of compromise from efficiency, fairness, and or stability. A distance function allows to quantify such concepts or the (dis)similarity between any two matchings. There are a few attempts to propose such functions; however, these are tailored for specific applications and ignore the individual preferences completely. In this paper, we construct a normative framework to quantify the difference between outcomes of market mechanisms in matching market...
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作者：Grochulski, Borys; Zhang, Yuzhe
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：In this paper, we study the conditions under which termination is a useful incentive device in the canonical dynamic principal-agent moral hazard model of Sannikov (2008). We find that temporary suspension of the agent after poor performance dominates termination if the principal's outside option is low and the agent's outside option is moderate. In suspension, the agent performs tasks free of moral hazard and receives no compensation, which rebuilds his skin in the game and allows for incenti...
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作者：Huang, Chao
作者单位：Nanjing Audit University
摘要：This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that a stable matching exists in a discrete matching market when the firms' preference profile satisfies a total unimodularity condition that is compatible with various forms of complementarities. We provide a class of firms' preference profiles that satisfy this condition.
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作者：Hopenhayn, Hugo; Saeedi, Maryam
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This paper addresses two central questions in markets with adverse selection: How does information impact the welfare of market participants (sellers and buyers)? Also, what is the optimal information disclosure policy and how is it affected by the planner's relative welfare weight on sellers' surplus versus consumers' surplus? We find that as a result of improved information, prices become more strongly associated with the true quality of sellers and, thus, more dispersed. This will result in...
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作者：Brandt, Felix; Lederer, Patrick
作者单位：Technical University of Munich
摘要：Gibbard and Satterthwaite have shown that the only single-valued social choice functions (SCFs) that satisfy nonimposition (i.e., the function's range coincides with its codomain) and strategyproofness (i.e., voters are never better off by misrepresenting their preferences) are dictatorships. In this paper, we consider set-valued social choice correspondences (SCCs) that are strategyproof according to Fishburn's preference extension and, in particular, the top cycle, an attractive SCC that ret...
