The winner-take-all dilemma

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kikuchi, Kazuya; Koriyama, Yukio
• 署名单位: Tokyo University of Foreign Studies; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE5248
• 发表日期: 2023-07-01
• 页码: 917-940
• 关键词: Representative democracy; winner-take-all rule; proportional rule; prisoner's dilemma; C72; D70; D72

摘要

We consider collective decision-making when society consists of groups endowed with voting weights. Each group chooses an internal rule that specifies the allocation of its weight to alternatives as a function of its members' preferences. Under fairly general conditions, we show that the winner-take-all rule is a dominant strategy, while the equilibrium is Pareto dominated, highlighting the dilemma structure between optimality for each group and for the whole society. We also develop a technique for asymptotic analysis and show Pareto dominance of the proportional rule.