-
作者：Patil, Sanket; Salant, Yuval
作者单位：Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Bangalore; Northwestern University
摘要：A statistical decision rule is a mapping from data to actions induced by statistical inference on the data. We characterize these rules for data that are chosen strategically in persuasion environments. A designer wishes to persuade a decision maker (DM) to take a particular action and decides how many Bernoulli experiments about a parameter of interest the DM can obtain. After obtaining these data and estimating the parameter value, the DM chooses to take the action if the estimated value exc...
-
作者：Silva, Francisco
作者单位：Deakin University
摘要：I study a persuasion game between a privately informed agent and a decision maker (DM) who can imperfectly verify the statements made by the agent by observing a signal that is correlated with the agent's information. I find that whether or not the DM benefits from communicating with the agent depends on whether the DM's signal and the agent's private information satisfy a weak affiliation condition. I then discuss the significance of this result to the debate over the use of self-appraisals i...
-
作者：Brandl, Florian; Brandt, Felix
作者单位：University of Bonn; Technical University of Munich
摘要：Consider an urn filled with balls, each labeled with one of several possible collective decisions. Now let a random voter draw two balls from the urn and pick her more preferred as the collective decision. Relabel the losing ball with the collective decision, put both balls back into the urn, and repeat. Once in a while, relabel a randomly drawn ball with a random collective decision. We prove that the empirical distribution of collective decisions produced by this process approximates a maxim...
-
作者：Fabbri, Giorgio; Faggian, Silvia; Freni, Giuseppe
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble; INRAE; Universite Grenoble Alpes (UGA); Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Parthenope University Naples
摘要：This study examines the dynamics of the exploitation of a natural resource distributed among and flowing between several nodes connected via a weighted, directed network. The network represents the locations and interactions of the resource nodes. A regulator decides to designate some of the nodes as natural reserves where no exploitation is allowed. The remaining nodes are assigned (one-to-one) to players, who exploit the resource at the node. It is demonstrated how the equilibrium exploitati...
-
作者：Zhao, Wei; Mezzetti, Claudio; Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, Tristan
作者单位：Renmin University of China; University of Queensland; University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of Adelaide; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We consider a dynamic principal-agent problem, where the sole instrument the principal has to incentivize the agent is the disclosure of information. The principal aims at maximizing the (discounted) number of times the agent chooses the principal's preferred action. We show that there exists an optimal policy, where the principal recommends its most preferred action and discloses information as a reward in the next period, until either this action becomes statically optimal for the agent or t...
-
作者：Balbuzanov, Ivan; Kotowski, Maciej H.
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Notre Dame
摘要：This paper investigates the formation of production and trading networks in economies with general interdependencies and complex property rights. We argue that the right to exclude, a core tenet of property, grants asset owners local monopoly power that is amplified by an economy's endogenous production network. Our analysis generalizes the exclusion core, a cooperative solution concept based on the right to exclude, to markets with production. We identify sufficient (and essentially necessary...
-
作者：Lang, Xu; Mishra, Debasis
作者单位：Shandong University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule. We show that every such interim allocation probability can be implemented as a convex combination of two families of deterministic voting rules: qualified majority and qualified anti-majority. We also provide analogous results by requiring implementation by a symmetric monotone (strategy-proof) voting rule and by a...
-
作者：Sun, Yiman
作者单位：Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague
摘要：We study the interaction between an agent of uncertain type, whose project gives rise to both good and bad news, and an evaluator who must decide if and when to fire the agent. The agent can hide bad news from the evaluator at some cost, and will do so if this secures her a significant increase in tenure. When bad news is conclusive, censorship hurts the evaluator, the good agent, and possibly the bad agent. However, when bad news is inconclusive, censorship may benefit all those players. This...
-
作者：Pereyra, Juan S.; Silva, Francisco
作者单位：Universidad de Montevideo; Deakin University
摘要：Objects of different quality are to be allocated to agents. Agents can receive at most one object, and there are not enough high-quality objects for every agent. The value to the social planner from allocating objects to any given agent depends on that agent's private information. The social planner is unable to use transfers to give incentives for agents to convey their private information. Instead, she is able to imperfectly verify their reports through signals that are positively affiliated...
-
作者：Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study large-population repeated games where players are symmetric but not anonymous, so player-specific rewards and punishments are feasible. Players may be commitment types who always take the same action. Even though players are not anonymous, we show that an anti-folk theorem holds when the commitment action is population dominant, meaning that it secures a payoff greater than the population average payoff. For example, voluntary public goods provision in large populations is impossible ...
