Second-chance offers and buyer reputation systems: theory and evidence on auctions with default

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Engelmann, Dirk; Frank, Jeff; Koch, Alexander K.; Valente, Marieta
• 署名单位: Humboldt University of Berlin; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Aarhus University; Universidade do Minho
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12448
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 484-511
• 关键词: sequential auctions; 2nd-price auctions; online feedback; takeover-bids; winners curse; ebay; price; trust; COOPERATION; mechanisms

摘要

Winners in online auctions frequently fail to complete purchases. Major auction platforms therefore allow second-chance offers (the runner-up bidder pays his own bid price) and let sellers leave negative feedback on buyers who default. We show theoretically that (i) all else equal, the availability of second-chance offers reduces bids; (ii) sellers have no incentive to exclude bidders, even if they are nearly certain to default; (iii) buyer reputation systems reward bidders known to default with a positive probability. Our experiments show that the economic forces identified in the theoretical model are important enough to have predictive power for bidder behavior.