Monitoring with Career Concerns

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Marinovic, Ivan; Szydlowski, Martin
• 署名单位: Stanford University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12412
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 404-428
• 关键词: incomplete contracts; corporate crime; management; TENURE

摘要

We study monitoring in a continuous-time career concerns model. A monitor oversees an agent and generates verifiable evidence if the agent shirks. The monitor's ability is uncertain and requires costly investment to maintain. Unpunished shirking reveals that the monitor is ineffective, which discourages the monitor from maintaining her ability. The agent shirks strategically to discourage the monitor, because shirking increases the rate of learning. Term limits reduce the incentive to shirk and long-serving monitors accept bribes to hide evidence.