Matching auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fershtman, Daniel; Pavan, Alessandro
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12399
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 32-62
• 关键词: Dynamic mechanism design; COMPETITION; INFORMATION; CONTRACTS; STABILITY

摘要

We study platform markets in which agents arrive gradually, experience changes to their preferences over time, and are frequently re-matched. We introduce simple auctions specifically designed for such markets. Upon joining, agents select a status that determines the weight assigned to their future bids. Each match is then assigned a score that depends on the agents' reciprocal bids and status. The matches maximizing the sum of the bilateral scores are implemented. Under certain conditions, such auctions maximize profits, welfare, or a combination of the two. We use the results to shed light on the distortions due to platforms' market power.