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作者：Hauser, Daniel N.
作者单位：Aalto University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：I model a firm that invests in the quality of its product and influences how that quality is disclosed. The firm can promote its product; at random intervals it can disclose quality for a cost. At low reputations, promotion allows a firm to reestablish itself and the firm invests to take advantage of this. However, the ability to promote crowds out incentives for investment at high reputations generated by other information sources, in particular information that is generated whenever the firm...
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作者：Rosa, Benjamin, V
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Government procurement contracts are frequently subject to policies that specify a subcontracting requirement for the utilization of historically disadvantaged firms. I study how such subcontracting policies affect procurement auctions using data from New Mexico's Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program. Theoretically, subcontracting requirements reduce prime contractors' private information on their costs by requiring them to select their subcontractors from a common pool of disadvantaged f...
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作者：Bollinger, Bryan; Doraszelski, Ulrich; Judd, Kenneth L.; McDevitt, Ryan C.
作者单位：New York University; University of Pennsylvania; Stanford University; Duke University
摘要：We develop and analyze a dynamic model in which firms decide when and where to enter a growing market. We do not pre-specify the order of entry, allowing instead for the leader and follower to be determined endogenously. We characterize the subgame perfect equilibria of the dynamic game and show the times and locations of entry are governed by the threat of preemption, which leads to premature entry, less extreme locations, and the dissipation of rents. Using data on gas stations, restaurants,...
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作者：Aryal, Gaurab; Zincenko, Federico
作者单位：Boston University; University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln
摘要：We propose an empirical framework for asymmetric Cournot oligopoly with private information about variable costs. First, considering a linear demand for a homogeneous product with a random intercept, we characterize the Bayesian Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Then we establish the identification of the joint distribution of demand and firm-specific cost distributions. Following the identification steps, we propose a likelihood-based estimation method and apply it to the global market for crude oil ...
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作者：Astebro, Thomas; Fernandez, Manuel; Lovo, Stefano; Vulkan, Nir
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Universidad de los Andes - Chile; University of Oxford
摘要：We build a model of equity crowdfunding that incorporates the two major funding models: all-or-nothing (AoN) and keep-it-all (KIA). Both informed and uninformed investors arrive sequentially and rationally choose whether and how much to invest. The KIA solution turns out to be a reduced version of AoN without signalling. We test predictions using data from a leading European equity crowdfunding platform and find support. Results are consistent with rational information aggregation. However, ne...
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作者：Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Williams, Cole
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：We show that in search markets an influencer who recommends a product to her followers improves consumer surplus and total welfare despite the firm paying for her recommendation. As consumers learn their value for the product upon search, they will not buy at the recommended firm if they learn their value is low. The threat of search incentivizes firms to offer the influencer a financial contract involving a commission and incentivizes the influencer to be honest in her recommendation. Provide...
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作者：Marku, Keler; Ocampo, Sergio; Tondji, Jean-Baptiste
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); University of Texas System; University of Texas Rio Grande Valley
摘要：Business activities often involve a common agent managing a variety of projects on behalf of investors with potentially conflicting interests. The extent of the agent's actions is also often unknown to investors, who have to design contracts that provide incentives to the manager despite this lack of crucial knowledge. We consider a game between several principals and a common agent, where principals know only a subset of the actions available to the agent. Principals demand robustness and eva...
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作者：Anderson, Simon; Defolie, Ozlem Bedre
作者单位：University of Virginia; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; European University Institute; European School of Management & Technology
摘要：We model a platform controlling the variety and prices of the products it hosts via a percentage fee on sellers and choosing whether to sell its own products (hybrid mode). We derive a mixed market demand system for differentiated products with monopolistically competitive sellers and a sizeable platform product range. The hybrid platform steers consumers toward its products by charging higher seller fees than pure marketplace. This insidious steering intensifies the larger the platform's prod...
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作者：Mangin, Sephorah
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：We examine the effect of expected competition on markups in a random utility model where the number of competing firms may differ across consumers. Firms observe consumers' utility shocks and set prices using personalized pricing. We derive a precise condition under which the expected markup across consumers can be represented by a simple expression involving consumers' expected utility and the expected demand. This delivers a general condition under which greater expected competition is price...
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作者：Triviza, Eleftheria
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：This article analyses how consumers' habit formation and addiction affect firms' pricing policies. I consider both sophisticated consumers, who realize that their current consumption will affect future tastes, and naive consumers, who do not. The optimal contract for sophisticated consumers is a two-part tariff. The main result is that the optimal pricing pattern when the consumer is naive is a bargain then rip-off contract, namely a fixed fee, with the first units priced below cost, and then ...
