Health insurance menu design for large employers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ho, Kate; Lee, Robin S.
• 署名单位: Princeton University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12452
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 598-637
• 关键词: Moral hazard; adverse selection; plan choice; ECONOMICS; tradeoff; equilibrium; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; MARKETS; welfare

摘要

We provide a framework for large employers designing a menu of health plan offerings that differ on both financial and nonfinancial dimensions. Using administrative data from Harvard University, we estimate a model of plan choice and utilization, and evaluate the benefits of cost sharing and plan variety. For this population of consumers, and a single plan with a generous out-of-pocket maximum and zero deductible, modest cost sharing of approximately 30% maximizes average employee surplus. Gains from offering choice are meaningful only if financial differentiation is paired with differentiation along other dimensions where consumer preferences are correlated with efficient coverage levels.